The impact of the global economic crisis on Central Asia and its implications for the EU engagement. EUCAP Working Paper No. 5, 21 October 2009 by Kassenova, Nargis.
    working paper 05
Nargis Kassenova
October  2009
The impact of the global 
economic crisis on Central 
Asia and its implications for 
the EU engagement© EUCAM 2009
ISBN 13: 978-92-9079-933-7
October 2009ThE IMpACT Of ThE glOBAl 
ECONOMIC CrISIS ON CENTrAl ASIA 
ANd ITS IMplICATIONS fOr ThE EU 
ENgAgEMENT
EUCAM Working paper No. 5
Nargis Kassenova
Table of Contents
Introduction                       4
The economic crisis and domestic politics in Central Asia       4
  Kazakhstan                    4
  Kyrgyzstan                   6
  Tajikistan                      6
  Turkmenistan                    7
  Uzbekistan            8
The changing geopolitical balance in Central Asia       9
  Russia and China: Their interests and politics in the region     9
  The impact of the global economic crisis on the geopolitics of the region    10
The nexus between politics and geopolitics: Prospects for the EU’s        
engagement in Central Asia          1 2
Conclusions              134  EUCAM Working Paper No. 5
Introduction
There  is  a  profound  connection  between  economics  and 
politics. A stronger economy creates a basis for more ambitious 
political actions and programmes. At the opposite end, an 
economic downturn and recession breed social tensions and 
can undermine the political order. Both the EU and Central 
Asian  states  have  been  seriously  affected  by  the  global 
economic crisis, in different ways. This EUCAM working paper 
focuses on the impact of the crisis on Central Asian politics 
and geopolitics and the implications of these developments 
for EU engagement in the region. 
The  EU  strategy  for  Central  Asia  adopted  in  2007  was 
announced as the first political strategy towards the region. 
The claim implied that political goals are at the core of the 
document, which gives guidelines for the EU’s actions. These 
were defined as security and stability in Central Asia (including 
the  promotion  of  economic  prosperity,  good  governance, 
democratisation, the rule of law and human rights), along 
with  mutually  beneficial  energy  cooperation.  The  current 
economic crisis has worsened the poverty in Central Asian 
states  and  exacerbated  authoritarian  tendencies  in  their 
domestic politics. It has revealed the extent of bad governance 
and pushed the weakest states to the brink of failure. Thus, 
on the one hand, the crisis has made the task of political 
transformation (good governance, democratisation, the rule 
of law and human rights) more pressing, while on the other 
it has made it more challenging. The first part of this working 
paper looks at the impact of the crisis on domestic politics in 
Central Asian states. 
Although the strategy does not dwell on geopolitical issues, it 
is clear that the EU cannot effectively engage with the region 
without taking into account the presence of other external 
actors there (most importantly, Russia and China). The global 
economic crisis is affecting the geopolitical balance in Central 
Asia. Major actors – Russia, China, the US and the EU – are 
modifying  their  policies  in  the  region  in  response  to  new 
challenges and opportunities. Weakened Central Asian states 
(and their ruling regimes) are adapting to the circumstances. 
The second part of this paper is an attempt to define these 
shifts.  The  paper  concludes  with  some  considerations 
regarding the implications of the political and geopolitical 
developments in Central Asia for the EU’s engagement in the 
region and a number of recommendations.   
The economic crisis and domestic politics in 
Central Asia 
All  five  Central  Asian  states  have  authoritarian  political 
systems with similarities (extensive personalisation of power, 
patron–client relations and systemic corruption), but they also 
feature some important differences. Each country’s regime 
relies on its own set of resources and uses specific tools to 
stay in power. In various ways, they achieve the co-option of 
the elites, keep the general population in check and suppress 
those who have not been co-opted. The toolbox entails a 
combination of coercion, ideological work/propaganda and 
economic benefits. The present economic crisis has affected 
the ability of Central Asian regimes to deal with these tasks.
Kazakhstan
Over  a  decade,  Kazakhstan’s  economy  enjoyed  an  8-9% 
growth rate due to high prices for oil and metals. Kazakhstan 
became  the  largest  economy  in  the  region  (with  its  GDP 
comprising  more  than  60%  of  the  combined  GDP  of  the 
Central Asian states). Although the riches were concentrated 
at the top, some resources were trickling down. As a result, 
the percentage of people living below the national poverty 
level decreased from 40% in the late 1990s to around 14% 
in  2007.1  Economic  growth  became  an  important  source 
of  legitimacy  for  the  regime.  The  worsening  situation  of 
neighbouring Central Asian states in the background served 
to boost the positive image of the Kazakhstani leadership. 
While  economic  activities  were  encouraged,  the  political 
activities of citizens were suppressed. None of the elections 
was  recognised  as  free  and  fair  by  the  OSCE  monitoring 
missions; freedoms of expression, assembly and association 
remained limited and the media (especially in the electronic 
domain) were kept under tight control. The official line could be 
summed up as ‘economic reforms first, democratisation later’, 
aimed at fostering a politically apathetic but entrepreneurial 
and consumption-oriented population. 
The  abundance  of  money  in  the  system  and  its  relative 
openness allowed for the appearance of a certain pluralism 
in the political space similar to that of Russia. Business elites 
for various reasons have been supporting opposition parties, 
their electoral campaigns and newspapers. They have to use 
discretion and they can be threatened into stopping such 
assistance.2 The task of persuasion is mostly undertaken by 
1  See  CIA,  The  World  Factbook,  CIA,  Washington,  D.C.  (retrieved 
from  https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/
index.html).
2    One  of  the  richest  businessmen  in  Kazakhstan,  the  CEO  of 
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the financial police. Generally, excessive political ambitions 
are punished, as is typical for authoritarian systems. 
The ‘fat years’ finished in 2007, when the banking sector 
was hit by the US subprime crisis. The resulting credit crunch 
undermined the construction sector, one of the pillars of the 
booming Kazakh economy. Low prices for oil and metals, the 
main export commodities, were another serious blow that 
decreased budget revenues considerably. Stalled construction 
sites and closing mines generated the conditions for mounting 
social tensions.
The  government  response  was  to  open  up  the  national 
oil fund and pump money into the economy. Around $19 
billion  (or  14%  of  GDP)  was  invested  in  the  construction, 
banking, agricultural and other sectors.3 The government also 
developed an action plan (‘roadmap’) to create employment 
opportunities (through retraining, signing agreements with 
large companies on retaining work places and cutting migrant 
labour  quotas).  In  addition,  efforts  were  made  to  attract 
foreign  investments.  The  largest  infusion  was  the  loan  of 
$10 billion from China to invest in energy and infrastructure 
projects. 
According to the government, all these measures together 
with rising prices for export commodities (chiefly oil) led to 
an improvement in the prospects of the Kazakh economy. In 
September 2009, the prime minister announced that the crisis 
had passed and that GDP would show some growth by the 
end of the year (in June, the ministry of economy and budget 
planning had expected a 2% contraction). Non-government 
experts are generally more sceptical and predict an autumn 
of non-payments, bad debts and rising unemployment. 
What political consequences can be traced to the two-year 
crisis and what are the implications if it continues? The most 
obvious consequence is the growing number of unemployed 
persons throughout the country or those who are formally 
employed but who are not receiving any salary. As a result, 
strikes  are  becoming  a  regular  feature.4  So  far,  they  are 
not coordinated and do not present a big challenge to the 
government, which still has resources to avoid major negative 
developments. The leadership could also put the blame on 
outside factors, deflecting criticism of its own management 
failures. 
Nevertheless,  the  spread  of  public  dissatisfaction  worries 
the government, which might have been one of the reasons 
it was hesitant to call parliamentary elections despite the 
embarrassment of heading towards the OSCE chairmanship in 
2010 with one ruling party in the parliament. If the elections 
Kazkommertsbank Nurzhan Subkhanberdin, was warned about the 
ensuing problems if he continued to support the opposition Ak Zhol 
party. Consequently, he withdrew funding. 
3   See Nursultan Nazarbayev’s speech at the 21st Foreign Investors’ 
Council Plenary Session, 12 June 2009.
4   An overview of the strikes that took place in 2009 can be found on 
the website of the Socialist Resistance of Kazakhstan (retrieved from 
http://kazakhstan.socialism.ru/news/kazakhstan/2009/voln.html). 
take place by the end of the year, the opposition will have the 
chance to increase its support base through the accumulation 
and organisation of protest sentiments in society. Even so, the 
regime has all the levers to provide for the desired election 
results and keep the general situation under control. On the 
one hand, the crisis has given rise to opportunities for the 
political opposition, but on the other, it has decreased the 
financial resources from which they can draw. Businessmen 
who  could  support  opposition  parties  and  their  activities 
while their fortunes were growing now find themselves in 
more constrained circumstances. 
Importantly, the business community is experiencing hard 
times not only owing to the crisis but also because of the 
pressures  brought  on  by  an  ‘anti-corruption  campaign’, 
resulting in the arrest of a number of high- and medium-
level  officials  and  executives  (the  scale  of  the  campaign 
is  unprecedented).  There  is  a  perception  that  the  secret 
services and financial police have been given carte blanche 
to put the country’s house in order by reminding the elites of 
their vulnerability. The official goal of the campaign – cleaning 
up the system – is viewed with scepticism, considering the 
selectiveness of arrests and top-to-bottom corruption that 
has not left untouched law enforcement bodies or the judicial 
sector. Therefore, the campaign has instilled fear among the 
political and economic elites, which are ‘disciplined’ in this 
way into following the rules of the game. But it has failed to 
tackle the problem of corruption at a deeper level, which 
would  have  been  beneficial  for  the  development  of  the 
country. 
It  can  be  argued  that  the  fear  that  the  regime  is  trying 
to invoke among the elites is a reflection of the fear it is 
experiencing  itself.  The  economic  crisis  has  revealed  the 
fragility of Kazakhstan’s success story, and scandals related to 
‘Kazakhgate’ and Rakhat Aliyev have induced tighter controls 
over the political space.5 Simultaneously, the government has 
been under pressure to show some liberalisation efforts to the 
OSCE and its member states, which granted it chairmanship 
on certain conditions. At present, unfortunately for the EU 
and for the political development of Kazakhstan, the tendency 
towards self-preservation is stronger than the incentive to 
look good in the eyes of the European community.6 
5   Kazakhgate is a US-based investigation into whether Nursultan 
Nazarbayev  and  high-level  Kazakh  officials  took  bribes  from  US 
companies in exchange for lucrative oil contracts. Rakhat Aliyev is a 
former son-in-law of President Nazarbayev, who used to hold important 
government positions (including deputy head of the National Security 
Committee, vice-minister of foreign affairs and ambassador to Austria 
and OSCE). In May 2007, he was dismissed from his posts, later tried 
in absentia and sentenced to 40 years on various charges. Currently, 
Aliyev is in exile in Vienna. 
6   In July 2009, President Nazarbayev signed the Law on Information 
and  Communication  Networks,  which  limits  considerably  both  the 
freedom of the Internet and that of traditional media, despite the 
harsh criticism of the law by the OSCE, the EU and the US. There 
is  continual  pressure  on  independent  media  (major  opposition 
newspapers are losing trials and going bankrupt and journalists are 
being arrested for libel and ‘revealing state secrets’). Another worrying 
development is the proposal made by the ruling Nur-Otan party to 
adopt a constitutional law “On the Leader of the Nation”, which would 6  EUCAM Working Paper No. 5
Kyrgyzstan
In the early 1990s, Kyrgyzstan prided itself on being an ‘island 
of  democracy’  in  Central  Asia.  Yet,  very  soon  afterwards 
it started digressing. By the time of the tulip revolution in 
March 2005, Kyrgyzstan had turned into a soft authoritarian 
(allowing most freedoms) and overall rather dysfunctional 
(in terms of governance) state. When challenged by public 
dissatisfaction after another round of rigged elections, the 
regime of President Askar Akayev collapsed. 
The  subsequent  regime  of  President  Kurmanbek  Bakiyev 
proved  to  be  a  major  disappointment  in  terms  of  both 
democratisation  and  better  governance.  The  authoritarian 
tendencies have been growing and becoming more obvious, 
with  power  increasingly  concentrated  in  the  president’s 
hands, freedoms curtailed and the state captured by private 
interests (family and friends of the new leader). The lesson 
learnt by the new regime from the experiences of the old one 
was the necessity of a stronger coercive apparatus able to 
prevent another tulip revolution.
Kyrgyzstan  is  poorer  in  resources  than  Kazakhstan,  and 
the  enrichment  of  the  elites  was  not  accompanied  by 
a  redistribution  or  trickle-down  effect.  Around  40%  of 
the  population  live  below  the  poverty  line.7  The  physical 
infrastructure and access to basic public services – such as 
running water, public sewage systems, health and education 
– have deteriorated over the decades of independence. 
The economic crisis has worsened the situation considerably. 
The  downturn  in  Russia  and  Kazakhstan,  the  main  trade 
partners  of  Kyrgyzstan,  has  led  to  a  plunge  in  industrial 
production  (by  about  20%  in  the  first  quarter  of  2009).8 
Remittances sent by Kyrgyz labour migrants from these two 
countries, which accounted for a third of GDP, also decreased 
by 40-50%.9 Thousands of migrants returned to Kyrgyzstan, 
adding to the levels of unemployment and the possibility of 
social tensions. As the most telling evidence of mismanagement 
and corruption, in Kyrgyzstan, where hydropower is among 
the major exports, there have been multiple energy crises. 
In addition to rising prices, the impoverished population has 
had to deal with regular power cuts. 
The political opposition tried to capitalise on these difficulties 
during the presidential election campaign of July 2009. But 
it is weak and fragmented, and the people are distrustful of 
give Nursultan Nazarbaeyev the possibility of a life-long presidency. 
7    These  are  estimates  for  2004,  derived  from  the  CIA’s  World 
Factbook, CIA, Washington, D.C. (retrieved from https://www.cia.gov/
library/publications/the-world-factbook/index.html).
8  See the article “Kyrgyzstan: Industrial Output Plunges”, Eurasianet.
org,  05.07.2009  (retrieved  from  http://www.eurasianet.org/
departments/news/articles/eav050709.shtml).
9   See the article “Kyrgyzstan: Returning Migrants are a Cause for 
Concern”,  Eurasianet.org,  04.03.2009  (retrieved  from  http://www.
eurasianet.org/departments/news/articles/eav040309e.shtml);  see 
also E. Marat, “Shrinking Remittances Increase Labour Migration from 
Central Asia”, CACI Analyst, Central Asia–Caucasus Institute, 02.11.2009 
(retrieved from http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/5035).
and generally disengaged from politics. Thus, although the 
elections were no less flawed than those that caused the 
tulip revolution, Kurmanbek Bakiyev could stay in power with 
relative comfort. 
Protests take the form of local actions, the most common 
being blocking nearby roads until the government takes into 
account the demands of the protestors and makes certain 
promises. A more covert and principled form of protesting 
against bad governance is expressed in the growing popularity 
of Islamist movements and sentiments among the population. 
The  government  perceives  this  trend  as  very  dangerous 
and cracks down on members of Hizb ut-Tahrir and other 
similar organisations. The scale of the trend is hard to define 
given that the authorities are purposely mythologising and 
exaggerating it; however, the ground for it is becoming only 
more fertile. 
Unlike  its  Kazakh  counterpart,  the  Kyrgyz  government 
has no reserves to draw upon to alleviate the effect of the 
crisis. Therefore, it is trying to acquire grants and loans from 
external actors. It managed to negotiate a $2 billion assistance 
package from Russia (reportedly in return for the decision to 
close the US military base on its territory). Later, the Kyrgyz 
government signed an agreement with the US on hosting the 
International Transit Centre (de facto, keeping the base but 
under a different name) after the American side increased 
the payments tenfold (from $17.4 million to $178 million).10
Yet  these  infusions  of  money  cannot  substitute  for  the 
absence of an anti-crisis strategy. The business environment 
is  deteriorating  and  corruption  is  rampant.  Kyrgyzstan  is 
acquiring the features of a weak, bordering on failing state: 
unable to provide for the basic needs of the people and ever 
more vulnerable to external and internal security threats.11 
Although political and social upheavals in the nearest future 
are unlikely, the prospects for the country are bleak. 
Tajikistan
Tajikistan  was  the  poorest  and  most  dependent  on  union 
subsidies among the Soviet Asian republics. The civil war of 
1992–97 took a heavy toll from the population and largely 
destroyed  the  economy  of  the  country.  The  negotiated 
peace  agreement  introduced  a  coalition  government  with 
a  third  of  the  seats  given  to  the  United  Tajik  Opposition. 
President Imomali Rahmon was nonetheless gradually able 
to consolidate his personal power. At present, the political 
opposition is marginalised and cannot put up a real challenge 
10   Derived from Kommersant, 24.06.2009.
11   The Brookings Institution report by S. Rice and S. Patrick, Index 
of  State  Weakness  in  the  Developing  World  (Brookings  Institution, 
Washington, D.C., 2008) defines weak states as “countries that lack the 
essential capacity and/or will to fulfil four sets of critical government 
responsibilities: fostering an environment conducive to sustainable 
and  equitable  economic  growth;  establishing  and  maintaining 
legitimate, transparent, and accountable political institutions; securing 
their populations from violent conflict and controlling their territory; 
and meeting the basic human needs of their population” (retrieved 
from  http://www.brookings.edu/reports/2008/~/media/Files/rc/
reports/2008/02_weak_states_index/02_weak_states_index.pdf). The impact of the global economic crisis on Central Asia - Nargis Kassenova  7
to the regime.
Tajikistan remains the poorest of the Central Asian states. 
Around 60% of the population live below the poverty line. 
The  infrastructure  is  dilapidated  and  public  services  are 
minimal or nonexistent. The tough circumstances Tajikistan 
has to deal with as a remote, mountainous country bordering 
on tumultuous Afghanistan are aggravated by corruption and 
a very low level of professionalism in the government. 
The population is largely left to its own devices. Before the 
crisis,  1.5  million  Tajik  labour  migrants  sent  money  home 
(mostly  from  Russia  and  Kazakhstan),  keeping  afloat  their 
families and the economy of the country (their remittances 
constituted up to 50% of GDP). In the first quarter of 2009, 
the sums transferred officially through the banks fell by 33%.12 
Migrants are reluctantly returning to Tajikistan, which only 
worsens employment conditions and stability in the country. 
The crisis has hit the trade turnover and industries of Tajikistan. 
Currency returns from exports fell by 50%, mainly owing to 
the falling prices and demand for cotton and aluminium – two 
main export items. A third of the plants and factories have 
shut down and sent their employees home on unpaid holiday. 
Salaries and pensions (especially in rural areas) are paid with 
delay,  while  prices  for  basic  food  are  rising  alongside  gas 
tariffs.13 
To deal with the crisis the government turned to external 
actors  –  international  donor  organisations  and  individual 
countries. The IMF introduced a three-year credit programme 
of $116 million, and the Asian Development Bank is to provide 
a $120 million assistance package. The US doubled economic 
assistance  to  Tajikistan  to  $46.5  million.  China  agreed  to 
invest more than $1 billion in various infrastructure projects.14 
The assistance can slightly alleviate the harshness of some 
of the problems facing Tajikistan, but it cannot reduce the 
mismanagement/bad  governance  and  make  the  economy 
sustainable. 
Dissatisfaction  and  frustration  among  the  population  is 
growing. So far, these sentiments have not translated into 
political activity. Fear of another civil war and recognition 
that the most active part of the population is abroad might be 
factors accounting for this apathy. Both the secular opposition 
and the Islamic Renaissance Party are weak, and they do not 
present a challenge to Rahmon’s regime. A bigger threat may 
come  from  sources  outside  the  political  system  –  various 
Islamist  movements  (Salafia,  Tablighi  Jamaat  and  Hizb  ut-
Tahrir), former warriors of the United Tajik Opposition residing 
in  Tajikistan  and  combatants  returning  from  Afghanistan. 
12   See the article “IMF expects remittances to Tajikistan to decrease 
through the whole year”, Asia-Plus, 13.05.2009 (retrieved from http://
www.asiaplus.tj/en/news/49/51293.html).
13   See “Asia Times”: Crisis increases the number of poor in Tajikistan 
[Krisis uvelichivayet kolichestvo bednykh v Tadzhikistane], 07.08.2009 
(retrieved from http://www.paruskg.info/?p=13313).
14   See S. Olimova, Tajikistan, Report for the Central Asia Observatory, 
May–June 2009 (retrieved from http://www.casaasia.es/oac/uploads/
tajikistan_jul09.pdf).
Consequently, the authorities have been taking repressive 
measures against these actors. 
The effectiveness of coercion can nonetheless only be short-
term, especially when carried out by a largely dysfunctional 
and corrupt government. Tajikistan is closer to the condition 
of a failing state than any other Central Asian country. The 
economic crisis is pushing it further in this direction. 
Turkmenistan
Since independence, Turkmenistan has stood apart from the 
other Central Asian states through its self-imposed isolation 
and  the  remarkable  idiosyncrasies  of  its  first  president, 
Saparmurat  Niyazov.  The  regime  he  established  was  built 
around an extreme form of personality cult and it featured 
zero tolerance to any form of political opposition. Having rich 
energy reserves at its disposal, the government could provide 
the population with subsidised goods, which, together with 
heavy  ideological  brainwashing,  formed  the  basis  of  its 
legitimacy.
Since the death of Niyazov in December 2006, under the 
current President Gurbanguly Berdymukhamedov, the country 
has been undergoing a process of partial normalisation. Some 
of the most obnoxious laws and policies have been revoked 
and Turkmenistan has started opening up little by little to 
the  outside  world.  Berdymukhamedov  has  been  gradually 
dismantling  the  personality  cult  of  Niyazov,  substituting  it 
with a milder version of his own. 
The political system remains highly authoritarian. Elites are 
co-opted  through  access  to  resources  and  disciplined  by 
frequent  purges  and  reshuffles  in  the  government,  state 
administration and major enterprises in a manner typical for 
Central Asian regimes. The population is tightly controlled 
and  the  potential  for  people’s  meaningful  participation  in 
politics is suppressed. 
The isolation has not protected Turkmenistan from the impact 
of the global economic crisis. Falling prices and demand for 
its main export commodity – natural gas – has deprived the 
government of the lucrative revenues it had grown used to 
over the years. In April 2009, Russia (which buys most of 
Turkmenistan’s gas) sharply reduced its imports, which led 
to the explosion of one of the central pipelines and caused 
serious tension between these two countries.15 
The government loosened some of its most heavily subsidised 
prices: gasoline rose sevenfold, bus tickets twentyfold, and 
airline tickets tenfold. Prices for basic foods are rising too, up 
by 30% in 2008 for bread, eggs and meat.16 Electricity tariffs 
have gone up as well. In addition, foreign companies have 
cut the numbers of their local employees, especially in the 
15   See the article “Turkmenistan: Gas Blast Ignites Turkmen-Russian 
Row”,  Eurasianet.org,  04.10.2009  (retrieved  from  http://www.
eurasianet.org/departments/insightb/articles/eav041009b.shtml).
16  See S. Mitas, “Turkmenistan’s Economic Bubble”, Business Week, 
10.02.2009  (http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/
feb2009/gb20090210_156547.htm).8  EUCAM Working Paper No. 5
construction sector, increasing the levels of unemployment. 
All  this  has  led  to  confusion  and  frustration  among  the 
population and a wider gap between the rich and poor. 
Thus, the crisis is a challenge for the government. Still, as 
long as gas is a coveted commodity, the government, corrupt 
and inefficient as it is, has sufficient resources to provide for 
its own longevity. Society has been under such tight control 
for so long that its emancipation will require considerable 
time. The longer-term prospects are not clear however. The 
economy is stagnant, the system is hampered by the lack of 
a professional cadre, and the situation in the education and 
health sectors is dismal. Despite its riches, there is no basis 
for sustainable growth of the country. 
Uzbekistan
In  the  1990s,  while  Kazakhstan  and  Kyrgyzstan  were 
liberalising their economies and Turkmenistan was retaining 
the  command  economy,  Uzbekistan  chose  a  path  in  the 
middle. Its gradualist approach was praised for not exposing 
the population to the vagaries of the market and compared 
with East Asian models of development.17 Nevertheless, this 
comparison proved to be inaccurate. The system stifled the 
entrepreneurial initiative of the population and became mired 
in corruption. Within a decade of Uzbekistan’s independence, 
this potential economic powerhouse of the region lost the 
competition with Kazakhstan in terms of the size and vibrancy 
of the economy. 
The political development of the country was arrested as 
well. The regime of President Islam Karimov is built on fear 
and extensive use of the repressive apparatus. Uzbekistan 
has  turned  into  a  police  state  intolerant  of  any  form  of 
political opposition (secular or Islamic) or plurality of opinion 
(freedoms of expression, assembly or association are severely 
curtailed).  This  breeds  underground  dissent,  taking  the 
form of a radical and fundamentalist version of Islam that is 
endangering the future of the country. 
A  central  feature  of  the  regime  is  its  suppression  of  any 
criticism of its policies and a self-congratulatory approach 
reminiscent of Soviet times. It has praised itself for choosing 
less  integration  into  the  global  economy  and  thus  being 
invulnerable  to  the  impact  of  the  crisis.  At  present,  the 
government  boasts  an  8%  GDP  growth  rate  and  claims  it 
created half a million additional jobs in the first half of 2009.18 
But the real picture is not that rosy. 
Industrial output has stagnated or fallen in the main sectors 
of the economy. The crisis has affected prices and demand for 
the country’s leading export commodities: gas, metals and 
17    See  R.  Abasov,  Central  Asian  Republics’  Search  for  a  ‘Model 
of Development’, Central Asia in Transition No. 61, Slavic Research 
Centre, Sapporo, 1998 (retrieved from http://src-home.slav.hokudai.
ac.jp/publictn/61/rafis/rafis1.html).
18   See the article, “Crisis resistant or crisis prone?”, The Economist 
Intelligence  Unit  ViewsWire,  Economist.com,  08.09.2009  (retrieved 
from  http://www.economist.com/agenda/PrinterFriendly.cfm?story_
id=14070444).
cotton. The production of cars and buses is also falling due 
to the contraction of the Russian market. The welfare of the 
already impoverished population (26% of Uzbeks live below 
the poverty line) has been hit by a plunge in remittances from 
labour migrants (numbering in hundreds of thousands), which 
have fallen by 30% over the last year.19 Migrants are returning 
home with the hope of going back to Russia or Kazakhstan 
once the situation improves. 
The government realises the dangerous potential of these 
developments and is trying to take measures to counteract 
them.  It  was  decided  to  increase  salaries,  pensions  and 
benefits by 25% starting this past August, although it is likely 
that these hikes will be eaten by inflation. President Karimov 
also negotiated a labour migration agreement with the United 
Arab Emirates.20 
As for the Uzbek elites, it is clear that they must have been 
affected by the crisis economically, but the opaqueness of the 
system prevents a determination of whether that has led to any 
redistribution of power and influence. At present, President 
Karimov seems to be in full control of the situation. 
The regime has resources to forebear the economic crisis. 
At the same time, the crisis potential in this pivotal state of 
Central Asia is accumulating, and eventually the authorities 
might not be able to keep the lid on the boiling pot. 
Thus, the global economic crisis has affected the domestic 
situations in all of the Central Asian states and challenged 
all  five  regimes.  Interestingly,  the  biggest  challenges  are 
facing the richest (Kazakhstan) and poorest (Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan) countries in the region. 
Because of its relative openness to the world and a decade of 
economic growth, Kazakhstan’s political–economic system has 
acquired a complexity that requires more subtle mechanisms 
of  internal  balancing.  Repressive  measures  are  becoming 
too  crude  for  maintaining  the  functioning  of  the  system. 
Generally, the crisis has revealed the growing weaknesses of 
the regime. It seems that it is approaching the limits of its 
capacity to develop. 
As for Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, the crisis has aggravated the 
problem of bad governance and unconsolidated statehood. 
The population is impoverished and increasingly alienated, 
and the state has very limited resources to meet the challenges 
and mostly mismanages them. 
Economic  hardships  often  lead  to  a  strengthening  of 
authoritarian tendencies. In Central Asia, this trend can be 
seen in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In Kazakhstan, it is to some 
extent counterbalanced by the incentive to look presentable 
on  the  eve  of  its  OSCE  chairmanship.  In  Uzbekistan  and 
Turkmenistan, the two most repressive regimes of Central 
Asia, the restrictions on society are already so tight that there 
is no need to increase pressure. 
19   Ibid.
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The changing geopolitical balance in Central 
Asia
Russia and China: Their interests and policies in the 
region
Numerous external actors are active in the region of Central 
Asia, the most important being Russia, China and the US. 
This section focuses on Russia and China, since the greatest 
challenge for the EU is to decide how to carry out its Central 
Asian policy, taking into account the presence of the region’s 
two large neighbours. 
For Russia, Central Asian states are important as they form 
its  southern  flank  and  can  transmit  security  threats  and 
challenges,  such  as  radical  Islamism,  drug  trafficking  and 
illegal  migration.  Considering  that  the  borders  between 
Russia and Kazakhstan and between Kazakhstan and the rest 
of Central Asia are porous, the region cannot play the role of a 
buffer. Moreover, the Central Asian states generate problems 
for themselves and all have, to a varying degree, the potential 
to destabilise. The Central Asian states (with the exception of 
Turkmenistan) are members of the Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation (CSTO), the Russia-led military–political alliance 
whose goal is to provide for the security of the region, but 
whose capacity to do so has not been tested yet. 
The  hydrocarbon-rich  states  of  the  region  (Kazakhstan, 
Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan) are crucial to Russia’s energy 
export schemes. Moscow is trying to maintain control over 
the  export  of  Central  Asian  oil  and  gas  to  the  European 
markets. It makes major efforts to block the development of 
alternative export routes, such as the trans-Caspian oil and 
gas pipelines and the Nabucco pipeline. By controlling more 
resources, it aims at enhancing its political clout in the region 
and in the world. 
For the Russian economy, Central Asia is an area where its 
companies  are  most  competitive.  Since  early  1990s,  the 
economic  integration  of  the  post-Soviet  space,  including 
Central  Asia,  has  been  one  of  Moscow’s  priority  projects. 
When  the  development  of  a  common  economic  space  in 
the  Commonwealth  of  Independent  States  did  not  work, 
the  Eurasian  Economic  Community  (EurAsEC)  was  created 
with fewer members. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan 
are members; Uzbekistan joined in 2006 but suspended its 
membership  in  2008.21  In  the  framework  of  the  EurAsEC, 
the  Eurasian  Development  Bank  was  set  up  to  support 
development projects and to promote economic integration. 
The overall goal is to establish a customs union and build an 
economic base for a political union following the example of 
the EU. 
Another significant driver of Russia’s policy in Central Asia 
overlaps with the above three. Moscow sees itself as the 
traditional  patron  of  the  region,  and  Central  Asia  as  the 
21   There are six full members in the EurAsEC – Belarus, Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Russia, Uzbekistan (suspended membership) and Tajikistan. 
Armenia, Moldova and Ukraine are observers.
zone of its ‘privileged interests’ (as openly stated by current 
President Dmitry Medvedev). It is willing to assume both the 
glory and responsibility of being a great power, with areas 
under its control and influence. If Russia ‘loses’ Central Asia, 
the grounds for such a claim would shrink considerably. 
For  China,  Central  Asia  is  important  primarily  as  the 
neighbourhood  of  its  Xinjiang  province.  Initially,  Chinese 
authorities  had  fears  that  the  newly  independent  states 
of Central Asia would not only give inspiration to Muslim 
minorities in Xinjiang, but could also become the base of 
separatist  movements.  The  Central  Asian  states  proved 
to  be  highly  sensitive  to  Beijing’s  concerns,  however,  and 
chose to cooperate in the struggle against the ‘three evils’ 
of separatism, extremism and terrorism. That became one of 
the pillars of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) 
formed by China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan 
and Uzbekistan in 2001. Beijing has been carefully watching 
the dynamics in the region, for destabilisation in Central Asia 
could engender problems for the security of China (the fall 
of friendly governments, failing states unable to control the 
situation on the ground and suppress the three evils, and the 
risks posed for Chinese investments and businesses).22 
The second pillar of the SCO, strongly promoted by China, 
is  economic  cooperation.  China  is  interested  in  Central 
Asian natural resources (oil, gas, uranium and metals) and 
is a major supplier of manufactured commodities. Bilateral 
trade with all the Central Asian republics has been growing 
exponentially. In 2004, Beijing suggested the creation of a free 
trade zone among the SCO states, but this initiative was not 
well received by the other member states, whose industries 
cannot compete with those of China. Beijing is also trying out 
the role of a development assistance provider for the region: 
in 2006–07 it provided $900 million to Central Asian states for 
various infrastructure projects.23 
China has been successful in acquiring energy resources in 
two hydrocarbon-rich states of Central Asia: Kazakhstan and 
Turkmenistan. It built an oil pipeline that brings Kazakh oil 
to Xinjiang, and it is currently working on the construction 
of  a  gas  pipeline  that  would  connect  Turkmen  gas  fields 
– developed by a Chinese company – via Kazakhstan with 
China. 
For a long time, Russia considered the US its main rival in 
the region. Over the last few years, however, Russian experts 
have increasingly shown more concern about the growing 
influence of China. In its turn, China is trying not to disturb 
Russia and show respect for Russia’s dominance in the area, 
seeing it as beneficial for the security of the region. 
As  for  the  Central  Asian  states  themselves,  they  have  all 
22   The July interethnic clashes in Xinjiang make it obvious that 
Central Asians must also watch carefully the internal dynamics of their 
giant neighbour.
23  See  N.  Kassenova,  China  as  an  Emerging  Donor  in  Tajikistan 
and Kyrgyzstan, Russie.NEI.Visions, No. 36, IFRI, Paris, January 2009 
(retrieved  from  http://www.ifri.org/files/Russie/ifri_China_Central_
Asia_kassenova_ENG_January2008.pdf).10  EUCAM Working Paper No. 5
chosen the so-called ‘multi-vector’ foreign policy. They are 
clinging to Russia as the main patron of the area, but at the 
same time drawing benefits from the interaction with other 
actors and their interest in natural resources or geo-strategic 
position. Central Asian states do not have full confidence in 
Russia or the benign nature or consistency of its policies. 
They have seen that Russia can provoke disorder, support 
sides in regional conflicts and aggravate separatism (such as 
in the south Caucasus) or be heavy handed when it does not 
like developments in one of the post-Soviet states (as shown 
in  the  Russian–Ukrainian  gas  crises  and  sudden  sanitary 
embargos on imports from Georgia, Moldova or Belarus). 
Central  Asian  leaders  draw  on  the  support  of  the  West, 
primarily from the US, to counterbalance Russian influence. 
Still, being clearly authoritarian, they are afraid of the Western 
democratisation  agenda.  There  are  two  main  arguments 
used  to  prevent  ‘interference  in  internal  affairs’  (such  as 
demands to comply with OSCE commitments or international 
conventions signed by the Central Asian states): the ‘young 
age’ of ‘budding democracies’ in the region and the threat 
of Islamic radicalism overtaking the region if the established 
‘order’  were  unsettled.24  The  latter  argument  has  some 
validity, although it should be taken into account that while 
the  governments  of  Central  Asia  are  suppressing  Islamist 
movements,  they  are  also  sowing  fertile  ground  for  their 
development (through a combination of injustices, poverty, 
and falling levels of public services and education).
China is an external actor with whom Central Asian leaders 
are most comfortable. Beijing provides moral and financial 
support, does not interfere in internal affairs and is overall 
sensitive  to  local  concerns  and  fears.  Simultaneously, 
Central Asians are not fully relaxed with regard to China’s 
increasing might and potential for economic dominance and 
demographic pressure. 
There  is  not  much  trust  among  Central  Asian  states 
themselves, which stalls regional cooperation and prevents 
them from pulling their resources together and making the 
region stronger with regard to external pressures. Thus, the 
situation is characterised by a general shortage of trust.
The impact of the global economic crisis on the 
geopolitics of the region
The economic crisis has weakened Central Asian states and 
made them more anxious to seek foreign assistance, which has 
brought about a different set of interests and opportunities 
for external actors. 
Russia openly assumes responsibility for the region and it 
has been most active in arranging various forms of help for 
Central Asian states to deal with the crisis. On a bilateral 
basis, Moscow agreed to provide a large assistance package 
24   At a conference in Almaty in June 2008, Special Representative 
for Central Asia Pierre Morel commented that any “colour revolution” 
in the region would most likely be a “green revolution” (referring to 
green as the colour associated with Islam).
to  Kyrgyzstan:  $150  million  in  grant  aid,  $300  million  in 
preferential credit and a $1.7 billion loan for the construction 
of the hydropower plant Kambarta-1. Moscow also forgave 
the Kyrgyz debt of $180 million.25
The  loan/grant/debt  relief  agreements  were  signed  in 
February 2009 during President Bakiyev’s visit to Moscow, 
at which time he announced the coming closure of the US 
base at Manas. Although both the Kyrgyz and the Russian 
sides denied any connection between the financial aid and 
the base, the general opinion was that Russia had pushed for 
the sudden anti-US stance in Bishkek. 
At the multilateral level, the main locus of activities is the 
EurAsEC. In May 2009, its council for financial and economic 
issues adopted an anti-crisis action plan and set up a $10 billion 
anti-crisis fund. Russia is to contribute the bulk of the fund – 
$7.5 billion – and initially Kazakhstan will add $1 billion, and 
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan will contribute $1 million each. The 
fund will be governed by a council composed of the ministers 
of finance and managed by the Eurasian Development Bank. 
It is planned that the money will be used for stabilisation 
credits for member states and joint investment projects.26 
It  remains  to  be  seen  how  successful  this  fund  will  be. 
Stabilisation  credits  for  member  states,  considering  the 
inefficiency and corruption, might disappear without much 
trace. As for the joint projects, the countries that need the 
investments  most  (in  Central  Asia,  being  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Tajikistan) have the most difficult business environment in 
which to operate. 
Another initiative within the EurAsEC framework triggered by 
the economic crisis has been the decision to speed up the 
development of the customs union among Russia, Belarus 
and  Kazakhstan.  Kyrgyzstan  announced  that  it  also  wants 
to join. According to the new agreement, the union is to be 
in place by the beginning of 2010.27 It is expected that the 
removal of trade barriers would stimulate the economies of 
the participant states and help them resist pressures from 
outside. 
Thus, Moscow’s policy in Central Asia during the economic 
crisis  has  been  straightforward  –  it  sees  a  need  and  an 
opportunity to increase its role in the region. At the same 
time,  the  Russian  economy  itself  has  been  heavily  hit  by 
the crisis and cannot support all the ambitious plans of the 
Kremlin. 
On the one hand, Moscow promotes economic integration 
and the removal of trade barriers with Central Asian states, 
while on the other, it is forced by the crisis to cut labour 
migration  quotas,  a  decision  that  is  painful  for  the  Tajik, 
Kyrgyz and Uzbek economies. It promises large investment 
25   Derived from Kommersant, 03.02.2009.
26   See Rossiyskaya gazeta, 21.05.2009 (retrieved from http://www.
rg.ru/2009/05/21/evrazes.html).
27   Derived from Nursultan Nazarbayev’s speech at the 21st Foreign 
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packages, but it does not always deliver (as in the case of the 
$2 billion of investments promised to Tajikistan that has not 
materialised).28
The discrepancy between intentions and capacities is most 
obvious in the energy sector. As already mentioned, Moscow 
is trying to retain control over Central Asian gas through a 
monopoly on transit routes and participation in development 
projects. In the wake of the first Ukrainian–Russian gas crisis, 
Russian Gazprom agreed to buy most of the Turkmen gas and 
pay top prices for it. This move decreased Gazprom’s profits 
but  helped  it  impede  the  Nabucco  development  plans  of 
the EU. But once the demand was down in both Europe and 
Russia, and the company started losing profits, it confronted 
Turkmenistan with an ultimatum: cut volumes or decrease 
prices. Consequently, Gazprom abruptly reduced the volume 
of imported Turkmen gas (causing an explosion on one of the 
central pipelines), giving Ashgabad more incentives to look 
for alternative partners and transit routes.29  
Russia  does  not  have  enough  resources  (financial  or 
technological)  to  cover  the  needs  of  Central  Asian  states, 
therefore they will keep looking for alternative sources. The 
actor  equally  willing  to  render  assistance,  but  with  much 
deeper  pockets  than  those  of  Russia,  is  China.  Over  the 
decades of growth, Beijing has accumulated ample financial 
reserves, and now it is able to buy assets and give loans to 
cash-strained governments throughout the world. 
In the post-Soviet space, China has lent $25 billion to the 
Russian energy companies Rosneft and Transneft in exchange 
for a steady supply of oil in the next 20 years, and $10 billion 
to Kazakhstan to co-own a major oil and gas company and 
support infrastructure projects. China has also promised $4 
billion to Turkmenistan for the development of the giant South 
Yolotan field from which gas would be exported to China, 
and  more  than  $1  billion  to  Tajikistan  for  various  energy, 
transport infrastructure and communication projects. Beijing 
has additionally promised Dushanbe a grant of 60 million 
yuan ($8.78 million) to support the government’s anti-crisis 
programmes.30 
As already mentioned, it is not the first time China has offered 
financial assistance. Over the previous years, it has provided 
around  $900  million  to  Central  Asian  states  for  various 
infrastructure projects. With the economic crisis, however, 
28    See  the  article,  “Tajik  Leader  Arrives  in  Moscow  with  More 
Leverage,  Less  Faith,  Asia-Plus,  25.02.2009  (retrieved  from  http://
www.asiaplus.tj/en/articles/16/3143.html).
29   Cash-strained Gazprom also had to review its investment projects 
portfolio and withdraw from less strategic or promising projects. Thus, 
it returned the licenses to develop two gas fields in Uzbekistan, saying 
that  they  were  not  profitable.  The  licenses  were  taken  over  by  a 
Malaysian company.
30    See  the  RBK  Daily,  14.04.2009  (http://www.rbcdaily.
ru/2009/04/14/tek/410431);  see  also  “China,  Kazakhstan  Sign  $10 
billion Loan-for-Oil Agreements”, Bloomberg.org, 16.04.2009 (http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601089&sid=aRkoxDWplmJ
Y&refer=china); and also RIA Novosti, 24.06.2009 (http://en.rian.ru/
world/20090624/155342148.html); and S. Olimova (2009), op. cit.
the scale of the assistance has grown exponentially. It has 
become the biggest creditor of Tajikistan and Kazakhstan. 
It can be argued that the growing economic role of China in 
Central Asia will start translating into greater political influence. 
Central Asian states will be even more sensitive to Beijing’s 
domestic security concerns (the issue of Uighur separatism) 
and more supportive of China’s international agenda (such 
as reform of the UN Security Council). Beijing’s policy of non-
interference in domestic affairs might also change over time. 
The more pipelines that connect Central Asia with China, the 
more numerous are the reasons for China to view the region 
as a zone of its vital or very important interests. 
It  is  worth  noticing  that  the  crisis  has  created  certain 
opportunities for China, but it has also created major problems. 
Shrinking  global  markets  have  affected  the  development 
of Chinese industries. Unemployment and social and inter-
ethnic tensions are mounting. The recent clashes between 
Uighur and Chinese communities in Xinjiang were triggered 
by growing economic hardships. 
As for the EU, in line with its strategy for Central Asia it is 
increasing  its  engagement  in  the  region.  The  intensified 
political dialogue has brought about certain results. The EU has 
raised its profile in the region and advanced relations with all 
five states of Central Asia. Kazakhstan has adopted the “Path 
to Europe” state programme.31 The European Parliament has 
approved the Interim Trade Agreement with Turkmenistan, 
opening opportunities for European businesses there, and 
Ashgabad has promised gas for the Nabucco pipeline. 
The EU supports these initiatives with financial and technical 
resources.  The  strategy  provides  for  a  doubling  of  the 
assistance to the region to €719 million (allocated for 2007–
13). Nearly half of the total budget (40-45%) will be spent on 
poverty reduction and improving living standards. A third (30-
35%) will be spent on regional cooperation, with the focus 
on i) networks; ii) the environment; iii) border and migration 
management,  the  fight  against  international  crime,  and 
customs; and iv) education, scientific and people-to-people 
activities.32 
The EU has also made all Central Asian states eligible for 
investments  through  the  European  Investment  Bank  (EIB) 
(despite  the  controversy  about  the  poor  human  rights 
record  in  Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan).  In  December 
2006,  the  European  Commission  signed  a  Memorandum 
of Understanding with the EIB and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction  and  Development  on  closer  cooperation 
with  Russia,  the  Eastern  neighbourhood  countries  and 
Central Asia (with a separate ceiling of €1 billion for Asia). In 
November 2008, the European Council set the guidelines for 
investments in Central Asian states. They stated that, given 
31   An overview of Kazakhstan’s “Path to Europe” programme can 
be found in EUCAM Watch, No. 1, November 2008.
32    See  the  European  Community  Regional  Strategy  Paper  for 
Assistance  to  Central  Asia  for  the  period  2007-2013,  European 
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the  fragile,  external  financial  situations  of  Kyrgyzstan  and 
Tajikistan, these two countries should only contract additional 
debt on concessionary terms and that the EIB should focus its 
lending on energy supply and energy transport projects that 
also serve EU energy interests.33 To date, the EIB has signed a 
framework agreement with Tajikistan (providing for credits to 
support hydropower production). 
These  developments  are  not  related  to  the  crisis  but  the 
latter affects the agenda of the EU in Central Asia. At the 
EU–Central  Asia  meeting  at  the  foreign  minister  level  in 
May 2009, the parties discussed the impact of the crisis on 
trade, investment and migration. The Swedish presidency is 
planning to devote the next EU–Central Asia security forum 
in September 2009 to the global economic crisis as well. The 
bulk of the EU assistance already addresses those areas that 
have become even more problematic with the crisis: poverty 
reduction and migration. The EU is also giving additional aid 
to the most impoverished state of Central Asia, Tajikistan.34 
The European assistance is needed and welcomed by the 
Central Asian states. The goal is to channel it in a timely and 
effective manner. 
A different challenge is posed by Kazakhstan’s policies under 
the impact of the crisis. For years, the EU has been supporting 
Kazakhstan’s entry into the WTO (the objective of helping 
Central Asian states join the WTO is reflected in the EU strategy) 
and providing technical assistance to that end. In June 2009, 
Kazakhstan, Russia and Belarus announced the intention to 
establish a customs union by the beginning of 2010 and join 
the WTO as a union. Although the Kazakh government stated 
that WTO membership remains a priority for the country, it is 
clear that the process will slow down considerably (especially 
if  Belarus  remains  part  of  the  scheme).  As  explained  by 
government officials, the establishment of the customs union 
has been accelerated to alleviate the effect of the economic 
crisis.35 
It can be argued that Kazakhstan’s decision has also been 
shaped by geopolitical considerations. A customs union with 
Russia  would  counterbalance  the  growing  role  of  Chinese 
companies  in  the  economy  of  the  country.  The  logic  of 
Kazakhstan’s multi-vector foreign policy would dictate more 
efforts to strengthen relations with other actors, principally 
Russia. While the EU may feel disappointed by the slow down 
of  Kazakhstan’s  ascension  to  the  WTO,  European  policy-
makers should take into account the complex circumstances 
with which this Central Asian country has to deal. 
The changing geopolitical balance in Central Asia during the 
crisis  can  be  summed  up  as  follows.  Central  Asian  states 
33   See Council of the European Union, Council and Commission 
Declaration  on  certain  conditions  for  the  European  Investment 
Bank financing operations in the Central Asian countries, 14613/08, 
Brussels, 22.10.2008. 
34   Tajikistan received €20 million in emergency assistance from 
Brussels to avert a social crisis after a drought in February 2009. 
35   See “Kazakhstan’s Position on the WTO after the Creation of 
the  Customs  Union”,  Newsletter  Kazakhstan,  Special  Issue,  Kazak 
Embassy  in  the  Netherlands,  02.07.2009  (retrieved  from  http://
www.kazakhembassy.nl/newsletters/20090702-Newsletter%20
Kazakhstan%20Special%20Issue%20July%202%202009.pdf).
are  in  need  of  assistance  and  investments,  which  offers 
opportunities  for  external  actors.  Russia  has  increased  its 
influence,  although  its  record  is  patchy  owing  to  limited 
resources. On the other hand, China has ample resources to 
help enlarge its role in the region – which is an economic role 
at the moment, but which has the prospects of translating 
into a more influential political one. The EU’s role has been 
growing not as a consequence of the crisis, but that of the 
intention of greater engagement and interest.  
The  nexus  between  politics  and  geopolitics: 
Prospects for the EU’s engagement in Central 
Asia
What are the implications of these new and continuing political 
and geopolitical trends in Central Asia for EU engagement in 
the region? What constraints and possibilities do they entail 
for the implementation of the goals and interests of the EU 
as indicated in the strategy (security, energy cooperation and 
promotion of good governance and democratisation)? 
The analysis of both the political and geopolitical dynamics in 
Central Asia reveals the complex and challenging environment 
in which the EU has to operate. Authoritarianism is entrenched 
or  consolidating  in  all  five  Central  Asian  states.  The  main 
concern of the rulers is maintaining personal power. The crisis 
has exacerbated tendencies to strengthen authoritarianism. 
Kazakhstan is the only country in Central Asia where this trend 
can be observed in a difficult and conflictual co-existence 
with  the  opposite  trend  to  liberalise.  Despite  the  current 
worrying  developments  (the  failure  and  seeming  lack  of 
interest to meet the OSCE commitments made in Madrid to 
liberalise the political system, the ‘anti-corruption’ campaign, 
and new restrictions imposed on the Internet and traditional 
media), there is potential for the EU to influence the political 
development of this country. 
With  regard  to  the  rest  of  the  region,  this  potential  is 
minimal. The tulip revolution experience showed that the fall 
of the ruling regime does not result in the establishment of 
a flourishing democracy if the conditions for its functioning 
are absent. EU efforts in this direction are not meaningless, 
however, for they help create an alternative for the future that, 
considering other external influences and the neighbourhood 
of the region, would otherwise be absent. 
The  changing  geopolitical  context  also  gives  EU  policy-
makers some food for thought. Both Russia and China have 
a modernising influence on Central Asia and counterbalance 
the deepening underdevelopment tendencies in the region. 
Yet they also serve as moral and financial patrons of the local 
authoritarian regimes suppressing the political development 
of Central Asian states. They can provide financial assistance, 
but they cannot provide models of better organisation of the 
state or relations between the state and the people. 
The EU cannot and does not want to engage in full-blown 
competition  for  influence  in  Central  Asia.  The  approach 
chosen is cooperation with other actors, most importantly, 
Russia and China (except in the energy sphere). Regardless 
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well-being of the region, the possibilities for a cooperative 
framework are limited. In the economic sphere, transport 
corridors  across  Eurasia  can  be  built  to  everybody’s 
advantage. Joint efforts to prevent drug trafficking and foster 
fledgling cooperation related to the military and stabilisation 
efforts in Afghanistan can be strengthened. Otherwise, the 
views on and approaches to security and governance differ 
too much among the EU, Russia and China for comprehensive 
cooperation schemes in these areas. 
Conclusions
The  worsening  conditions  in  Kyrgyzstan  and  Tajikistan  1. 
raise  the  importance  of  EU  assistance  to  these  Central 
Asian states. The challenge is to make this aid timely and 
effective. The poor governance and high levels of corruption 
put serious constraints on partnership with government 
schemes. The active involvement of civil society and the 
private sector would help attain more tangible results.36 
As for the better-off countries of the region – Kazakhstan,  2. 
Turkmenistan  and  Uzbekistan  –  anti-crisis  cooperation 
can  focus  on  investments  and  improving  the  business 
environment. The Interim Trade Agreement signed with 
Turkmenistan is an important step in the right direction. 
Uzbekistan is likely to be the most difficult counterpart 
owing  to  the  nature  of  its  regime  and  because  unlike 
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, it has fewer incentives to 
promote energy cooperation with the EU.
With  Kazakhstan,  given  that  it  is  the  most  developed  3. 
market  in  the  region  and  has  an  interest  in  advancing 
relations with the EU, it is possible to try setting up a more 
comprehensive  and  in-depth  partnership  to  deal  with 
the  crisis  and  generally  promote  economic  integration. 
The creation of the customs union by Russia, Kazakhstan 
and Belarus (even though it would slow down the WTO 
entry process) is not a major impediment to that, taking 
into account that both Russia and Belarus are intent on 
developing closer ties with the EU in the economic sphere 
and view themselves as part of the European space. The 
SCO-based  free  trade  zone,  on  the  other  hand,  would 
form a China-focused area with unclear implications for 
Central  Asia  and  the EU (the  possible  consequences  of 
which include the squeezing out of European companies, 
a further consolidation of the resource-based nature of 
Central Asian economies and the political re-orientation of 
Central Asian states).
The  crisis  has  made  the  political  development  goals  of  4. 
the EU in the region (democratisation, promotion of good 
governance, human rights and the rule of law) even more 
difficult, as it has provoked a more self-protective attitude 
among the regimes. Nevertheless, the EU should consistently 
remind Central Asian states of the commitments they have 
undertaken. Local leaders should not have the impression 
that the EU is not serious about its own priorities and 
values, or that the EU can easily forsake them for access 
36   The rationale and a set of recommendations in this regard are 
suggested by Parviz Mullojanov in “The EU and Central Asia: Crisis of 
Labour Migration, Social Consequences and Required Policy Changes”, 
EUCAM Policy Brief, EUCAM, CEPS and FRIDE, Brussels and Madrid, 
forthcoming.
to hydrocarbons or military bases. Central Asian states are 
interested in bringing their resources to lucrative European 
markets,  as  well  as  European  investments  and  military 
cooperation with the West; therefore, human rights and 
good governance do not necessarily have to be made a 
bargaining chip in EU–Central Asian relations. That being 
said,  the  EU  should  be  realistic  in  its  expectations  and 
aim at long-term results, without discarding the ability of 
Central Asian societies to develop. 
Kazakhstan offers the greatest potential in terms of the  5. 
EU having an impact on its political development. It is a 
difficult partner in a state of confusion: the pro-European 
drive in its foreign policy (marked by the chairmanship 
of  OSCE  and  “Path  to  Europe”  programme)  and  some 
liberalisation  reforms  (such  as  new  laws  on  elections 
and  political  parties,  along  with  the  adoption  of  the 
national action plan in the sphere of human rights), are in 
contradiction with other policies seeking to limit freedom 
of expression and strengthen the personality cult. In this 
situation, the policies of the EU might turn out to be of 
crucial importance. Intensified ties, heightened attention 
to what is happening in Kazakhstan and a well thought-out 
combination of ‘carrots and sticks’ can help pull the country 
out of the maelstrom of consolidating authoritarianism and 
systemic crisis. The necessary channels are already in place: 
bilateral dialogues and relations with EU member states, 
OSCE and the Council of Europe.37 Some form of association 
of Kazakhstan with the European Neighbourhood Policy 
(ENP) could also be considered.38
As for the changing geopolitical context in Central Asia, the  6. 
EU should take into account the growing roles of Russia 
and China in the area. To make the EU an effective player, 
its policy-makers and expert community should thoroughly 
analyse the implications of this trend for the EU’s interests 
and goals. Both Russia and China have a stabilising and 
modernising influence on Central Asia, but at the same 
time, they constrain the political development of these 
countries  (undermining  the  base  of  their  long-term 
security).
Although the cooperative framework seems to be the best  7. 
way for the EU to engage in the region, it is important 
to  focus  on  practical  projects  where  such  cooperation 
can  yield  good  results  (for  instance,  combating  drug 
trafficking, border control, migration and the stabilisation 
of Afghanistan). Dialogue and coordination with regional 
security organisations (the CSTO and SCO) are valuable, 
but  considerably  different  approaches  to  security  make 
comprehensive  partnership  and  cooperation  schemes 
between  the  EU,  Russia  and  China  difficult  at  the 
moment. 
37   Kazakhstan has shown interest in strengthening cooperation with 
the Council of Europe. Its parliamentary members regularly attend 
sessions  of  the  Parliamentary  Assembly  of  the  Council  of  Europe 
(PACE) and PACE members are invited to Kazakhstan. The government 
attempted to attain special guest status at the Council of Europe, but 
failed. At present, Kazakhstan has an observer status at the Venice 
Commission. 
38   In 2006, Kazakhstan expressed a desire to join the ENP. The 
2008 “Path to Europe” mentions the ENP, but it does not list joining 
the ENP among the goals. At present, it is covered by the European 
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